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Re G (Children) (Residence: Same Sex Partner) [2006] UKHL 42:  
 
Daniel Monk 
 
 
The Facts 
 
G and W lived together in a lesbian relationship from 1995 to 2002. Wanting 
to have a family together, they arranged for G to be artificially inseminated, 
using sperm from an anonymous donor. She gave birth to two children, born 
in 1999 and 2001. In 2002 the relationship broke down, and the parties 
entered into relationships with new partners. In September 2003 W applied for 
an order for contact and a shared residence order, and an order was made for 
alternate weekend and holiday contact. The judge prohibited G from moving 
without W‟s consent or the court‟s leave, but rejected W‟s proposal for a 
shared residence order, largely because of hostility between the parties. The 
Court of Appeal allowed W‟s appeal against that refusal. Shortly afterwards, G 
moved secretly with her new partner and the children to Cornwall. W, who 
lived in Shropshire, applied for the children‟s primary home to be with her. The 
judge, who said that she had no confidence that if the children remained in 
Cornwall G would promote their essential close relationship with W and her 
family, ordered that the children should have their primary home with W. 
While the Court of Appeal dismissed G‟s appeal, she appealed, successfully, 
to the House of Lords and primary residence was restored to G, albeit with 
clear warnings that this was dependent on her adhering to contact 
arrangements with W.  
 
In her leading judgment, Baroness Hale concluded that the lower courts had 
„allowed the unusual context of this case to distract them from principles 
which are of universal application‟1 and asserted two key points. First, in 
accordance with section 1 of the Children Act 1989, the „welfare of the child‟ is 
                                                 
1 Re G para 44. 
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the paramount consideration of the courts. Consequently, while there was no 
presumption in favour of parent with a biological link with a child it is 
„undoubtedly an important and significant factor‟2 in determining what is best 
for the child, and the failure of the lower courts to address it was critical to the 
judgment. Secondly, she held that changing children‟s living arrangements 
should only be contemplated when a parent is failing to promote the child‟s 
welfare, and not as a form of punishment for bad behaviour. The first point 
was emphasised in stronger terms by Lord Scott of Foscote who held that 
„mothers are special‟3 and by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead who held that, „in 
the ordinary way the rearing of a child by his or her biological parent can be 
expected to be in the child's best interests . . . I decry any tendency to 
diminish the significance of this factor‟4. 
 
The social, policy and legal context 
 
In many respects the case is an every-day tale of a relationship breakdown 
and subsequent disagreement about the upbringing of the children. But it is 
one of the most important recent family law decisions and one that touches on 
a wide range of broader social developments. 
 
1. Lesbian and gay law reform 
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA) was enacted during the time that this 
case was working its way through the courts - a hugely symbolic social and 
legal moment for lesbians and gay men. By the time the Lords heard the case 
G had entered into a civil partnership with her new partner and W was about 
to do so with hers; an option that was not available to them during their seven 
year relationship. The CPA has given rise to supportive, ambivalent and 
critical commentary from within the lesbian and gay community.5 For some it 
                                                 
2 ibid. 
3 ibid para 3. 
4 ibid para 2. 
5 See, e.g., N Barker, „Sex and the Civil Partnership Act: The Future of (Non) 
Conjugality?, (2006) 14(2) Feminist Legal Studies 241; Lisa Glennon, „Strategizing 
for the Future through the Civil Partnership Act‟, (2006) Journal of Law and Society 
33(2): 244; R Auchmuty, „Same-Sex Marriage Revived: Feminist Critique and Legal 
Strategy‟, (2004) 14 Feminism and Psychology 101. 
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represents (almost) an end point in the process of law reform that began with 
the (partial) decriminalising of male homosexual acts by the Sexual Offences 
Act 1967. Oscar Wilde on being released from Reading Gaol is recorded as 
saying, „Yes, we shall win in the end; but the road will be long and red with 
monstrous martyrdoms.‟6 In family law most of the „martyrs‟ were lesbian 
mothers who frequently lost all contact with and, later, custody of their 
children solely on the basis of their sexuality.7 This case seems worlds away 
from that, recent, past. But it is salutary to remember that the „violence of law‟ 
in the old cases was a result of judicial interpretation of the „welfare of the 
child‟ – the paramount consideration enshrined in the Children Act 1989 – the 
same principle that Baroness Hale defended, with some passion, in this case. 
It was not a high profile publicly debated Act of Parliament that radically 
changed the position of lesbian mothers but incremental judicial law making in 
the name of children, not women. Progress indeed, and unquestionably cause 
for celebration, but, almost, like so much about laws relationship with 
lesbians, an invisible one – shrouded from „public‟ view and contingent on the 
rights of another.  
But in this new age or The World We Have Won, as Jeffrey Weeks, the 
leading British historian of sexuality puts it,8 the question that many critical 
and feminist commentators have asked is what does winning mean? At a 
moment when the principle of „equality‟ dominated the mainstream discussion 
of lesbian and gay law reform, it is perhaps not surprising that it dominated 
the judgment of Baroness Hale. Yet as Herman commented 15 years ago, 
„the extension of existing liberal categories to “new identities” not only 
“recognises”, but regulates, contains, and constitutes them‟.9 This insight 
questions the progressive narrative and suggests that we need to continue to 
examine the discourses through which lesbian mothers are viewed.  This 
                                                 
6 Earl of Arran, Hansard, HL Deb 21 July 1967 vol 285 cc52. 
7 See H Reece, 'Subverting the Stigmatization Argument' (1996), 23 Journal of Law 
and Society 484 and S Beresford, Get over your (Legal) „Self‟: A Brief History of 
Lesbians, Motherhood and the Law, (2008) 30(2) Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law 95. 
8 Jeffrey Weeks, The World We Have Won (London, Routledge, 2007) 
9 D Herman, „The Politics of Law Reform: Lesbian and Gay Rights into the 1990s‟ 
(1993), in J Bristow and AR Wilson (eds), Activiating Theory: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual 
Politics (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1993) 250. 
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project requires a quite different form of political engagement with law. For 
whereas the explicit homophobia in the old cases positioned all lesbians and 
gays against the law; cases such as Re G demonstrate how the new era of 
legal recognition creates both winners and losers within the lesbian and gay 
community. And this shift from a juridical prohibition to a more complex legal 
narrative might test the very political notion of a community. Indeed, it is 
significant that while lesbian and gay campaigns have been highly vocal in 
demanding equality of treatment in relation to becoming partners and parents 
(through civil partnership, adoption or reproductive technology) there is a 
notable silence about the possible meanings or application of the principle of 
equality in relation to separating lesbian and gay couples.10  
 
2. Family Law debates and Parenting 
The order made in the case is a shared residence order. As the feminist 
judgment explains, this order can be made for both symbolic and practical 
reasons. The context of recent debate about them has been attempts by 
certain parts of the fathers‟ rights movement to argue for an increase in their 
use in order to reflect a normative ideal of legal equality between parents.11 
This debate goes to the heart of divergent and frequently gendered 
perceptions of parenting, between those who see it as a status and those that 
view it as practice.12  
This conceptual distinction is also critical in addressing the issue of enforcing 
contact. This issue has dominated recent debates in family law, is a major 
issue for the fathers‟ rights movement and has led to new initiatives in The 
Children and Adoption Act 2006. As in this case, the issue requires courts to 
consider the extent to which the primary carer‟s own interests and desires are 
intimately connected to the child‟s best interests. Feminist commentaries have 
highlighted how the courts‟ approach impacts on mothers and, in particular, 
                                                 
10 For example the Stonewall website makes no reference to Re G. 
11 S Gilmore, „Court decision-making in shared residence order cases: a critical 
examination‟ (2006) 18 Child and Family Law Quarterly 478; F Kaganas, „Domestic 
Violence, Men‟s Groups and the Equivalence Argument‟ in A Diduck and K 
O‟Donovan (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (London, 
RoutledgeCavendish, 2006). 
12 C Smart, B Neale and A Wade, „The Changing experience of childhood: Families 
and Divorce (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001). 
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have critiqued the construction of women resisting contact as „implacably 
hostile‟. It could be argued that these debates and concerns inform Baroness 
Hale‟s judgment and even those critical of the judgment acknowledge that that 
the case will be useful for mothers in dispute with fathers.13 
Specific questions relating to lesbian parenting have occurred in the 
context of debates about reproductive technology. In this case G and W used 
sperm from an anonymous donor and Baroness Hale commented that for 
both safety reasons and to avoid potential conflict with a known sperm donor, 
„many might see this as the more responsible choice‟14. Where conflicts with a 
sperm donor have arisen, the parental claims of the biological father can be a 
threat to the lesbian parents‟ family unit.15  Since the case was decided, the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 now enables both members of 
a lesbian couple who use the services of a licensed clinic to be accorded the 
status of legal parents, in exactly the same way as heterosexual couples. The 
Act, however, describes the lesbian co-parent who does not give birth to the 
child as „the second female parent‟; the refusal to call her a mother reflecting 
what Herring describes as „law‟s obsession with a child only having one 
mother and one father‟.16  
 
How the decision was received  
 
The central focus of responses to Re G has been the significance of the 
biological link between a parent and child. Some commentators support the 
decision. Bainham, for example, argues that the „recognition given to the 
value of natural parenthood and the significance attached to the beginnings of 
life are much to be applauded‟.17 By contrast, Woodcraft argues that the 
reason for Bracewell J not having given sufficient indication of having 
                                                 
13 eg, E Woodcraft, „Re G: A Missed Opportunity‟ January Fam Law [2007] 53.  
14 Re G para 8. 
15 See Re D (Contact and Parental Responsibility: Lesbian Mothers and Known 
Father) [2006] EWHC 2 (Fam) and Re B (role of the biological father) [2007] EWHC 
1952 (Fam). 
16 J Herring, Family Law, (Harlow, Longman, 2009, 4th edn) 339.  
17 A Bainham, „Who or What is a Parent?‟, The Cambridge Law Journal [2007] 30, 
32. See also A Bainham, „Arguments about parentage‟ The Cambridge Law Journal 
[2008] 322; D Coombes and L Whitesmith, Fam Law 2006 36 (nov) 953-956, Natural 
born children: the House of Lords and the blood tie‟ 955. 
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considered the issue of the birth mother‟s role, „may well have been because 
she was treating the two women as equals, which is how, as Thorpe LJ said, 
they will appear to the children.‟18 Beresford notes in relation to W, that 
„nowhere is she referred to as the children‟s mother‟ and in the only 
commentary that draws on queer theory argues, that „As a lesbian mother, her 
non-conformity with heterosexuality continues to threaten the dominant legal 
discourse‟19. 
Critics of the decision, nevertheless, all note with approval the fact that 
Baroness Hale explicitly includes the social and psychological parent within 
the category of „natural parenthood‟.20 Their criticisms focus on the lack of 
clarity and/or the unfairness to the non-biological parent. For example, 
Woodcraft argues that the decision undercuts „any suggestion that the 
different forms of parenthood might be regarded as of equal importance‟, and 
„taken overall‟ says that „genetic and gestational parenthood trump 
psychological parenthood and birth mothers trump them all‟.21  
The language in the commentaries of hierarchies and „trumps‟ to 
describe the relationship between the competing forms of parenthoods, 
overshadows Baroness Hale‟s insistence on the paramountcy of the welfare 
principle and the rejection of any legal presumption. But lawyers as well as 
academics have drawn the same conclusions – the headline in the Solicitors 
Journal boldly stated that „Lords back Biological parents‟ rights.‟22 That this is 
the dominant message drawn from the decision may have important 
implications in practice. A crude „truth‟ has been established which can 
function as a powerful form of law.23 It is too early to know the full impact of 
the case but, as Bennett notes, „It makes the decision as to who biologically 
parents a child within a same sex relationship a crucial and potentially difficult 
                                                 
18 E Woodcraft, „Madonna Complex‟ (2006) Solicitors Journal, 150(33), 1095-1096 at 
1096 (emphasis added). 
19 S Beresford, above n 7 at 103. 
20 See, eg K Norrie, „Lesbian families, parenthood and contact‟ (2006) 51(10) JLSS 
24 http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/51-10/1003497.aspx. 
21 Woodcraft above n 18, at 1095. See also Beresford above n 7; Norrie above n 20. 
22 SJ 2006 150(29) 958. Only in the text is a more nuanced interpretation provided. 
23 See A Diduck, „Solicitors and Legal Subjects‟, in J Bridgeman and D Monk (eds), 
Feminist Perspectives on Child Law (London, Cavendish, 2000). 
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question‟.24 Coombes and Whitesmith suggest the possibility that some 
lesbian couples  „will review how they choose to go about having children‟ and 
that „there may be more children born as a result of one partner carrying the 
other‟s egg or more couples choosing to have one child each.‟25 
The application of Re G in subsequent cases has also focused on the 
significance of biological connection. In Re R (A Child) (residence Order) 
[2009] EWCA Civ 358, the Court of Appeal upheld the appeal of a mother 
against a decision to award residence to the paternal grandparents, with Wall 
LJ stating that the judge had not „grappled with the fundamental proposition 
that children have a right to be brought up by their natural parents unless their 
welfare positively demands the replacement of that right‟.26  In Re B (A Child) 
[2009] EWCA Civ 545, however, Wall LJ conceded that he „went too far‟27 in 
Re R, and held that the idea of there being any presumption in favour of a 
biological parent is „plainly inconsistent with Re G’. Rather, the test . . is 
welfare alone, and that it is wrong to talk in terms of “rights”‟.28  
Terminology also remains uncertain. For example In Re A (a child) 
(joint residence: parental responsibility) [2008] EWCA 867 Potter P cited Re G 
to emphasise the importance of psychological parenting but at the same time 
used the expressions „natural‟ and „biological‟ interchangeably29 to the extent 
that, despite Baroness Hale‟s definition, social parenthood is effectively 
excluded from the privileged category of „natural‟ 
 
The feminist judgment  
 
In important respects, the feminist judgment is in substantial agreement with 
that of Baroness Hale. Diduck not only concurs that the appeal should be 
allowed but agrees that the overriding principle is the welfare of the child and 
not parental rights. And applying the welfare principle, after a critical appraisal 
of the uses and recent history of shared residence orders and conditional 
                                                 
24  A Bennett, www.familylawweek.co.uk 17/3/09. 
25 Coombes and Whitesmith, above n 17 at 956. 
26
 Re R para 85. See also B v D and another [2006] All ER (D) 408. 
27 Re B para 41. 
28 ibid paras 60, 40. 
29
 Re A at paras 73, 91. 
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residence orders, she agrees that the Court of Appeal placed too much 
attention on the bad behaviour of G. That there should be substantial areas of 
agreement is not surprising – Baroness Hale is after all a feminist judge. 
Moreover the differences in the judgments of Hale and Diduck go to the heart 
of long-standing debates within feminism about sameness and difference and 
the tension between formal equality and the social realties of family life and 
relationships of care. 
The most critical difference is Diduck‟s rejection of the attempt by Hale 
to treat W and G in the same way - in the name of equality - as she would a 
heterosexual couple. And she does this for two distinct reasons. The first 
reason arises from an awareness of the lack of equality that same sex parents 
face in society. In other words, she recognises that formal legal equality too 
often assumes a level playing field and in doing so further exacerbates unfair 
treatment. The second ground for treating them differently would apply even if 
it could be established that social discrimination were no longer experienced 
by same-sex parents. Here Diduck argues that „formal equality of treatment 
obscures what is different about same sex parents‟ [7]. 
This approach is critical for Diduck‟s subsequent and key argument: 
that the House of Lords were wrong to attach as much significance as they 
did to the biological connection in determining both the fact of parenthood and 
child welfare [4]. For the emphasis on biology both presumes a heterosexual 
context and in doing so places a lesbian co-parent in a uniquely vulnerable 
position as, „only one can be genetically related and that fact should not 
become a legal disability for either the other parent or the child‟ [16]. 
The reference to the child here is significant. For while expressing 
sympathy with the position of the co-parent, she does not go as far as to claim 
rights for this parent. This is important, for the father‟s rights‟ movement also 
challenges the notion that biological mothers have automatic claims resulting 
from their privileged status, while asserting that fathers have equal rights to 
spend time with their children. Diduck‟s approach carefully demonstrates how 
the vulnerability of the lesbian co-parent can be addressed without weakening 
the position of women in heterosexual relationships. She achieves this by 
emphasising the importance of making welfare judgments in a non-
presumptive way on the basis of the realities of care rather than „abstract and 
 9 
possibly equivocal principles and  . . . claims to rights of the formal equality of 
parents.‟ [29] 
As a result, by neither equating it with heterosexual parenting, nor 
emphasising a difference between biological and non-biological parenting, 
Diduck‟s judgment makes lesbian parenthood visible – an important political 
move. But this is achieved within a flexible framework that creates space for 
and recognises the social, cultural and individual contingencies of both 
children and parents‟ lived experiences. In other words it is good for lesbian 
parents because it is good for families. 
 
